Bypass Flash Same Origin Policy with Add-On

The same-origin policy is an important concept in the web application security model. The policy permits scripts running on pages originating from the same site.

I found that users using FlashFirebug are vulnerable to same-origin policy bypass. This Firefox add-ons create a files on the Flash Player Trust directory disallowing same-origin policy.

For this example I will use Facebook Video preview box to trigger this Flash XSS. (Fortunately Faceboook use attachment.fbsbx.com )

By using a Flash XSS plus having FlashFirebug install on the Victim Firefox I can trigger this XSS and bypass Same Origin Policy

I report this to Facebook and this was the response:

And me as a good bounty hunter I report to Adobe:

After doing a bit of looking I found that o-minds.com have a report bug page and here is their response:

I reply to them and after that I didn't receive a response.

My conclusion:
External Addons can bypass Flash "Same Origin Policy" by adding a files to flash trust directory allowing all Script Access ignoring the Same Origin Policy and this happen without the user knowledge.

Video Poc:

Status:

This bug still works and apparently is not geting fixed soon.

One Cloud-based Local File Inclusion = Many Companies affected

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Dangerous Persistent XSS at Here.com [FIX]

Here.com, is a Nokia business unit that brings together Nokia's mapping and location assets under one brand. The technology of Here is based on a cloud-computing model, in which location data and services are stored on remote servers so that users have access to it regardless of which device they use. HERE Map Creator is a service launched by Nokia in November 2012 to allow users to map their neighborhood. With this bug I could SAVE a Road name with a payload on the map. Any user that try on re-edit the street name will get this XSS. I report a similar bug to Waza.com a few months ago . Nokia Reponse: Thanks to Nokia for starting this bug bounty program .

Stored XSS at Google firebase via Google Cloud IAM

Google Firebase demo console platform was allowing an attacker to store an XSS under the project name. This vulnerability was created on the main page of the select project. - "The Firebase demo project is a standard Firebase project with fully functioning Analytics, Crash Reporting, Test Lab, Notifications, Google Tag Manager and Remote Config features. Any Google user can access it. It’s a great way to look at real app data and explore the Firebase feature set." https://support.google.c om/firebase/answer/7157552 - Using Google IAM ( console.cloud.google.com ) was possible to create a payload and share it to the victim. Once the victim accepts the invitation at console.firebase.google.com the payload was rendered on the main project page. Impact: The attacker could share a project from " console.cloud.google.com " and store an XSS payload under console.firebase.google.com . This stored payload was been rendered every time the victim

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